Debris Part 11

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 9
Part 10
Part 12
Part 13
Part 14

After the flurry of debris reports in east bank projects during the spring of 2010, the reports - oddly - seemed to stop for about a year. But they started appearing again in the spring of 2011 as the Corps rushed to beat their June 1st deadline.

In Orleans Parish, the first spring 2011 mention of debris was on LPV-106 in the April 8, 2011 report:

"Still clumpy rocks in section between [Corps project LPV-]107 & [Corps project LPV-]108 where seeding has taken place."

Here's the locations of those three projects:


LPV-106 came up again about a month later, in the May 4, 2011 report:

"Still concrete and debris in turf area."

These referred to areas of finished levee. The contrator (L&A) had apparently placed soil with excessive debris in it and had yet to remove the debris from areas where grass was attempting to be grown.

We know the reports from April and from May were referring to separate areas of LPV-106 because of the May 5, 2011 report, which had more detail:

"Contractor has started a crew from [project LPV-]107 west towards Read blvd clearing debris from levee section to be grassed next. They will also clear out left debris in reach 5 and reseed in areas that grass has not established. Tuesday I will inspect levee clean up as contractor plans to seed next week."

The section of LPV-106 from LPV-107 west toward Read Blvd. is part of the much larger western section of the project, as opposed to the report in April of the smaller eastern patch between LPV-107 and LPV-108.

The same report noted debris in the soil on the flood side of the levee at adjacent project LPV-107 (contractor: Shavers-Whittle):

"debris removal and grading on flood side of levee."

About a week later, the May 11, 2011 report mentioned the contractor and the Corps had declared victory over the debris at LPV-106:

"contractor has cleared access rubble/debris from 107 tie in till Jahncke pump station [aka Sewerage & Water Board drainage pump station 14]. Contractor has not been able to confirm when seeding will take place."

Here's the location of Read Blvd. and the Jahncke Pump Station:


It was clear the debris problems were not conquered in May, because a month later they were still getting mentioned in LPV-106 updates. In the June 16, 2011 report we learned:

"Contractor is continuing to address debris in levee."

Frustratingly, none of these reports include photos. However, it is clear debris continued to be an issue even past the vaunted June 1, 2011 deadline when the Corps declared the system 100 year storm ready.

A second batch of spring 2011 debris reports comes from the Corps projects in St Bernard Parish. They're located here:


On February 24, 2011, the SLFPA-E inspector wrote about project LPV-148.02 (contractor: Cajun Construction):

"Observed fill material at top of levee slope appear to be non compliant with more than one percent contaminants in work area 1A and 1B."

The following day's report had a bit more detail:

"Discussed issues found on previous day's observation with Butter Compton. 1. Quality of backfill used for dressing levee does not conform to specification. Also quite a bit of dirt was left on stabalization slab. Butter talked with contractor and a coordination meeting is scheduled for Tuesday March 01, 2011."

We never find out what happened. The inspection reports are silent. However, debris continued to be a concern elsewhere.

LPV-146 (contractor: St Bernard Levee Partners), April 1, 2011:

"Contractor backfilled area on protective side with concrete rubble at the 90 degree turn in the wall at MRGO and Verrett [sic] wall."

See the map above for the sharp bend at the southeast corner of LPV-146.

Fortunately, we got pictures of this incident:








The reports don't indicate whether the concrete rubble was later removed.

LPV-145 (contractor: Chalmette Levee Constructors), April 4, 2011:

"There was discussion about debris and gravel in the slopes of the flood side. It appeared that the haul road material was pushed into the slopes of the flood side."

LPV-147 (contractor: Integrated Pro Services), April 5, 2011, after a pre-final inspection:

"There is unsuitable material and debris in the earthwork of the protective side slopes.

LPV-149 (contractor: Conti Group), June 16, 2011:

"There are concerns for backfilling with debris and trash."

That's seven projects with 2011 reports of debris in the dirt. That's on top of the six projects with debris concerns in the spring of 2010.

If you then combine that with the 9 west bank projects with debris problems...


You get 22 projects where debris has been a problem either in the existing levee, in the new levee, or in both.

22 projects.

Is it now obvious there is a systemwide problem with the integrity of the levees built by the Corps? It should be.

Debris Part 10

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 9
Part 11
Part 12
Part 13
Part 14

Much pressure was brought to bear upon the Corps over the past few months to address the debris problems in the west bank levees, and there have been halting measures to do so. A "tiger team" of other Corps people from outside New Orleans was brought in, they dug some holes in the levee at a single one of the projects (in the wrong spots), and then dug some more holes (in the right spots) while they literally tried to bury the evidence, which included a shopping cart and hubcaps. They also promised Senator Vitter they would add the west bank levees to their third party review process - a process meant to review designs before they're built, not after they're all done and shown to be defective.

But the west bank levees were not designed or constructed in a vacuum apart from the rest of the region. One must ask if the same problems have arisen with the rest of the system. The answer is "Yes."

We know of two large debris fields in the Lake Pontchartrain lakefront levees in Kenner, because the Times-Picayune reported on them in November, 2009 and January, 2010. In those cases, the existing levee was found to be filled with junk from a site on North Claiborne Avenue in New Orleans. The spoiled soil had been placed there by the Corps in 2000-01. We never heard about any further east bank levee problems after that, and the Corps certainly attempted to give the impression they were isolated - albeit 8000 foot long - cases.

A few months back I noted the receipt of the reports from the inspectors assigned to Corps projects within the geographic area assigned to the east bank levee authority (the SLFPA-East). I have finally finished plowing through them, and will be presenting what I've dug out over the next few posts. First up is evidence of many more instances of debris in the east bank levees. All the excerpts below are taken from these reports, downloadable at the earlier post.

Let's start at project LPV-104.02 (LPV stands for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, the official Corps name for all the levees on the east bank of the Mississippi). Here's the location of LPV-104.02:


LPV-104.02 is a catchall project involving a few small projects bundled together along the lakefront between the London Avenue canal and the Industrial Canal. One of those little projects was the installation of a vehicle ramp over the levee behind the main campus at UNO (University of New Orleans).

The lead contractor on LPV-104.02 is Quality Enterprises. They were placing the first "lift" of the ramp on the UNO side of the levee in May, 2010 (a "lift" is a layer of dirt, usually six to twelve inches thick). On May 13, 2010, the SLFPA-E inspector wrote the following about his inspection on the prior day:

"1st 6" lift was applied on protected side of the levee. Material from stock pile on LPV-104.01 [adjacent project - ed.] was used for this lift, and placed over the area that was cleared and grubbed 10" to 12" as stated by specifications. The material despite how much was cleared, was filled with small shells. These shells mixed with the material used for the first lift which caused it to have more than 5% debris in material. Material used was also considered to be too wet to pass moisture test, but will be cut up to dry out before next lift would be applied. Billy Rossignol [Corps resident engineer for the project - ed.] was asked to come and make a decision regarding the material being filled with the shells from the site. The decision was made that nothing can be done about this lift and to leave as is."

Isn't that nice? The bottom six inches of the earthwork are filled with shells (at 5 times the specified limit, no less), as shown in this picture from the same report:


But don't worry, they did something:

"Corrective measure will be done to prevent this from happening in the remaining lifts. Corrective action include not stockpiling material on the site, and scraping the surrounding area to move shelled material away from toe of ramp. (40ft offset to be exact)"

Note their "corrective" measures did not correct the actual problem by removing the debris. Their response to that was simply to leave it in place, which it is now.

Isolated incident of debris in the dirt? Not so much. Over at LPV-108 (contractor: Boh Brothers), a lakefront levee project at the exreme end of New Orleans East as shown on this map:


the SLFPA-E inspector wrote in his April 16, 2010 report:

"Corps inspector mentioned being unhappy with the size and amount of rock that is in the soil being used. Will follow up with this."

The follow-up came in the April 27th report:

"The dirt as mentioned in previous report is has not been filtered properly. It is filled with debris and material over the specified allowable size and over the specificed percentage of the material. The Contractor will be getting a formal letter requesting a correction plan from Billy Rossignol."

The inspector included this photo:


along with a caption informing us the material had been placed in the levee, debris and all:

"An example of the size of rocks that have been pulled from the surface of the material. This is a very small amount compared to what is on the surface of the entire project. Also if this is what is on the surface, what is located through the entire soil subsurface[?]"

That's a damn good question. Based on what we've seen at the west bank projects, the answer is probably that the LPV-108 levee had debris inside it.

A couple of weeks later, the May 13th report read,

"Corrective action has been done regarding soil conditions. Boh Bros was asked to remove a 5' wide by 6" deep section of material along the entire wall. Perform compaction and moisture tests on the area. Replace with stock pile material from pit, compact, and test to specifications."

Anyone who thinks the debris only went 6" down, raise their hands.

Just the Corps folks and their contractors? Okay, moving on...

Throughout the spring of 2010, debris was found at three other lakefront projects. At project LPV-103.1A1 (contractor: Aquaterra-CAYO), a levee project located in Orleans Parish between the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals...


...SLFPA-E inspectors reported the following:

"Starting to clean out dirt on the west side. The embankment material is full of large rocks and debris which is unacceptable for final use. Process will continue till the material is to specification." (April 20, 2010 report)

"Working on filtering out unwanted material in the back fill that is onsite." (April 30, 2010)

"Continue to remove debris in material on west side of Bayou St. John." (June 17, 2010)

Unfortunately, this is all the information we have from the reports. However, the events at two other projects were described more fully.

At LPV-19.2 (contractor: Phylway), a Jefferson Parish lakefront levee enlargement placement project located on either side of the Causeway:


this got reported on May 5, 2010:

"Found unsuitable material on F/S of levee at stations 409+00 and 419+50. It appears to be an old ramp that was covered up. Once contractor has provided enough material on site to fill the area they will start to do exploratory excavation to see exactly how much material will be removed."

Those locations are just 1000 feet apart, yet the Corps appears to have not dealt with anything in between them, viewing them as isolated instances. Pictures from the report give some more perspective, albeit only on the easternmost debris site at station 419+50, right next to the Causeway:



Te black stuff in the lower photo appears to be about a foot thick section of asphalt.

It is unclear if Phylway covered up the debris-laden area during prior work placing a berm at the base of the levee, or if they were excavating it in anticipation of normal work. Whatever the choronology, it is interesting to see their name on yet another project involving debris.

However, unlike the west bank projects Phylway worked on, in this east bank case, the Corps decided to excise the debris from the existing levee. Subsequent inspection reports tell us Phylway started moving in replacement material very quickly (5/6/10: "Began stockpiling material for areas where they are to remove unsuitable material."), and the removal of the bad dirt started around a week later (5/14/10: "Dug out unsuitable material area near Sta. 419+50. Unsuitable area around Sta. 409+00 still to be dug out."). Photos from the May 14, 2010 report show the excavation:



The dig out of the debris-laden material continued for about a week. The May 20, 2010 report said Phylway had moved to the second area: "Unsuitable material was removed from the F/S of the levee at Sta. 409+00. The area was approx. 150' wide." Photos also show that removal effort:



The Corps had a walkthrough on May 24, 2010 to determine whether Phylway had gotten everything. A third area was actually found with debris, according to the May 25, 2010 report: "Area at Sta. 407+00 near the Severn ramp where unsuitable material was found was dug out some more to remove a little excess that was found during inspection on Monday 5/24/10. Area was reinserted and approved for contractor to begin placing material and bring levee section back up to grade." Here's a picture:


But they declared victory on the other two areas and started backfilling them at the same time. Here's a photo of that backfilling in the May 27, 2010 report:


About a week later, the backfilling was nearly done, according to the June 2, 2010 report: "Work at this reach is almost done with the two sites that had material removed almost rebuilder [sic]."

Other than a single mention buried on page 21 of a SLFPA-E set of board meeting minutes from May, 2010 (minutes which were not published until two months later), none of this activity at LPV-19.2 was ever revealed to the press or the public by anyone. Given how close these events were happening to the beginning of the 2010 hurricane season, that's understandable from a public relations viewpoint. From a "complete disclosure," "partnership," or "protection of citizens" viewpoint though, I can't think of a justifiation.

But there were even more debris-related problems out at the lakefront besides all these. In April, 2010, debris was found in at LPV-20.1 (contractor: L&S/CKS Joint Venture), the project to enlarge the Jefferson Parish lakefront levee from Bonnabel over to the 17th Street canal. Here's the location of that project:


The first mention was in the April 13th report. It was just one sentence: "Special report filed unsuitable material in Levee." The "special report" was not included with the regular report.

The following day the SLFPA-E inspector reported "follow up" at the site, but gave no details. Reports over the following two days revealed the location (a ramp in front of the Coast Guard station) and the fact that more debris had been found.

On April 19th, it was revealed the Corps held a walkthrough to decide whether enough debris had been excised to allow the ramp to be rebuilt. This report (by a different inspector) also included much more detail:

"The USACE held a final walk through to approve the removal of unsuitable material in the Ramp and Levee. After a second check of levee the levee was deemed to be clean. The material that was removed will be stockpiled at Williams Blvd. Boat Launch. The plan is to use the material in foreshore protection. The USACE is still waiting on redesign of ramp."

This report also included photos, which show how extensive the dig out was. The photos are shot looking east toward the 17th Street canal, progressing from the protected (land) side of the levee to the flood (lake) side:





It's that last photo - showing the LPV-20.1 debris removal effort was not confined strictly to a protected side ramp, but also involved the flood side facing the lake - which is the most disturbing by virtue of the caption: "Flood side of levee any remaining large chumks [sic] of concrete will be removed."

"Large chunks of concrete?" Yikes.

Like the debris problems at LPV-19.2, this also got a single mention in the SLFPA-E board minutes, in this case on page 16 of the April, 2010 minutes. There was nothing else.

That's five different projects across two parishes with debris problems in the spring of 2010, almost none of which was revealed to the public. In the next part we'll discuss even more projects where debris was found as recently as last spring, after the Corps declared the system 100-year ready.

Seriously?

Times-Picayune, October 26, 2011:

"Mark J. Titus, 48, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud for bilking $1.2 million from a construction firm in a scheme allegedly aided by his brother-in-law Dominick Fazzio, River Birch's chief financial officer.

Fazzio, 58, of Slidell, used two construction companies he owns to send seven fraudulent invoices from June 2008 through March to Garner Services, a New Orleans construction management firm, according to a five-page "factual basis" for Titus' guilty plea."

FedBizOpps.gov, December 9, 2011:

Y--West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, LA HSDRRS, Lake Cataouatche Levee Enlargement, Phase 2, First Lift, Jefferson Parish, LA ED 11-203Solicitation Number: WBV15A-12-S-0001
Agency: Department of the Army
Office: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Location: USACE District, New Orleans

"This is a combined synopsis/solicitation for commercial items prepared in accordance with the format in Subpart 12.6, as supplemented with additional information included in this notice. This announcement constitutes the only solicitation; proposals are being requested and a written solicitation will not be issued.

THIS IS BEING POSTED FOR SUBCONTRACTING OPPORUNITIES ONLY. PROPOSALS WILL ONLY BE ACCEPTED FROM MATOC HOLDERS AS FOLLOWS:
[...]
W912P8-10-D-0009
Garner Services, LLC
348 S Diamond St
New Orleans, LA 70130-3808

POC: Mark Titus
Email: mtitus@garnersvc.com
Office: 504-566-1192
Fax: 504-566-1173"
[...]
SYNOPSIS:

The work consists of clearing and grubbing; removal of steel sheet pile; Contractor furnished borrow pit preparation and excavation; placement of earthen material, the earthen material shall be graded and compacted; placement of stone armor; fertilizing, seeding and mulching all disturbed areas and all other incidental work.

What exactly does it take for the Corps to cut ties with companies? This is a solicitation for new business, not an existing contract, but they are insisting on allowing Garner to bid on it. At the very least, don't they read the papers?

Update, February 1, 2012:
This job was awarded to Conquistador Dorado Joint Venture out of Sanford, Florida on January 24, 2012 for $2,609,737.50.

Plus or minus two projects

Update, 8/18/12: This post wil be updated, now that new information on the production of the 2009 Cost Report to Congress has been acquired (see here). For now, the raw data below remains valid, but the conclusion that the Corps inflated the estimates given to Congress fromthose produced by Black and Veatch is incorrect. The B and V estimates were without contingency and escalation. Those two items are what made up the difference between the estimates given to Congress and the B and V numbers. However, it appears the Corps manipulated the Option 1 number when it came in higher than the appropriation, effectively lying to Congress.

After more than 500 days, the Corps finally released the documents I had been asking for in the permanent pumps saga. It is obvious why they held them back.

In March, 2009 the Corps delivered a report to Congress on the releative costs of Option 1 (keep the existing outfall canal walls, levees, and pump stations, while adding a pump station at the end of each canal) and Option 2 (line the canals with concrete, get rid of the walls and levees, demolish the existing pump stations, and have new lakefront pump stations to handle all drainage). There's also an Option 2a, which adds a diversion of drainage from the Hoey's Basin section of Jefferson and Orleans Parishes. That stormwater would be routed to the Mississippi River.

The report presented these as the costs:


Over $3.4 billion dollars for Option 2. That's certainly an eye-popping number and makes Option 2 look inconceivably expensive compared to the $797 million for Option 1. The Corps, unlike everyone else - including the people protected by this project - wanted Option 1.

There's one problem: it appears those cost numbers are not the truth, according to these new documents.

In a December, 2008 internal cost estimate prepared by Corps consultants Black & Veatch as part of the effort to write the Report to Congress, Option 2's engineering and construction costs were estimated at about $1.8 billion, not the $3 billion+ number.

Let's make sure we're comparing apples to apples here. The internal estimate is strictly for the engineering and construction of the facilities. It leaves out stuff like land acquisition, relocations, and construction management. The line items from the Report to Congress for just the Option 2 pump stations, canal revisions, and engineering were these:


The sum of the highlighted items is $3.219 billion.

There's one further clarification: the internal estimate (a document titled, "Basis of the Cost Estimate Developed by Black & Veatch to Support the 2008 Report to Congress" - the mention of 2008 indicates the original deadline of the report, which was busted by the Corps) calls out a couple of different flavors for Option 2, one with breakwaters in front of the 17th Street canal and Orleans Avenue canal stations, one without. However, that's a minor distinction, because both are about $1.8 billion:


The estimate for the same items as reported to Congress is $1.6 billion more - 77% greater - than what the Corps' internal numbers showed.

Put another way, that's a difference of about double the Congressional appropriation of $804 million for the entire project.

But wait there's more.

The Report to Congress called out the total price for Option 1 as $797 million, conveniently just below the appropriated amount. I wrote quite a bit in 2009 about how the Corps likely slashed their Option 1 estimate to make it fit the appropriation, moving the costs to Option 2. The slashing is confirmed explicitly by the new documents, in a part when Black & Veatch is describing the process of updating their cost estimates from an earlier round performed in 2006:

"Material Costs Update. The 2006 estimate was then updated to current (October 2008) costs. There were significant upward cost revisions in many areas, the greatest being in the fabrication costs for the pumps and drivers. When these costs were added, the Option 1 cost estimate appeared to be very close to, perhaps over, the appropriated amount. This cost estimate was termed the “Robust Adaptable Option 1”. HPO leadership asked B&V to find ways to reduce costs, and an aggressive review of all costs was undertaken.

Base Adaptable Pump Station. Careful examination of the design concepts incorporated in the “Robust” design resulted in significant cost savings, and the development of a new design called the “Base Adaptable Option 1”. This concept and the estimate developed from it, became the basis of the “Base to Go”, the cost of Option 1 for the Report to Congress."

So the "Base Adaptable Pump Station" is the flavor of Option 1 that became the basis for the estimate in the Report to Congress. So what was the internal estimate for the Option 1 Base Adapatable flavor?


$480 million.

Just to make sure we're doing apple to apples, here's what the Report to Congress called out for just the pump station, small revisions to the canals, and engineering:


That total - released in March, 2009 - is $752 million. That's an inflation of 56% from the internal estimate published in December, 2008.

I'm sure there's lots of people out in the field who know loads more about Corps estimating than I do, and would very much like to poke holes in what I'm saying here. However, I believe such criticisms will likely amount to nibbling around the edges of what appears to be a massive overestimation of the costs of the project likely designed to perform two Corps objectives:

1) Make Option 2 look so costly as to be impossible to construct.
2) Make Option 1 look to fit perfectly within the Congressional appropriation.

The public suspected objective 1 was going on. After all, Orleans and Jefferson Parishes commissioned a study showing the actual costs of Option 2 were over a billion dollars less than what the Corps was reporting. However, objective number two, while speculation on my part, appears to be new news. It comes out of the very surprising result that the Corps was radically inflating the Option 1 estimate as well. To what end were they doing this? Perhaps to avoid having the appropriation slashed by Congress. If Congress knew the Corps believed Option 1 could be built for half what had been appropriated, there likely would have been pressure to cut the funds.

What this appears to come down to is that the Corps may have, let's say, "stretched the truth" in reporting the costs of the permanent pumping project to Congress and the public. A $1.6 billion difference in internal and external cost estimates for Option 2 is very tough to explain away, as is the 56% increase in Option 1 costs. But I look forward to the Corps attempting to do so.

5701 Pratt

This is very odd.

A demolition permit for a privately owned house along the London Avenue canal was given to the contractor on the London Avenue canal remediation contract, Integrated Pro Services, on October 4, 2011.

Permit 11BLD-06904 authorizes IPS to demolish 5701 Pratt.

This property falls within an area the Corps said they would use as a staging area during the remediation repairs; it is not behind any of the areas actually remediated. Supposedly all the substantial work on the London Avenue canal is done. So what is going on here?

[UPDATE: More than likely, this is just for the removal of the contractor's construction trailer at this site (see the last page of the Corps' monthly remediation updates - such as this one from the end of April, 2011 - for confirmation of the location), and the New Orleans Safety & Permits department incorrectly typed in the permit as a private home. So it's probably not odd at all.]

[UPPERDATE: I have been told this demolition is actualy for flood protection purposes, and that the house was to be purchased by the Orleans Levee District, though the assessor's record doesn't reflect such a sale. According to a comment by the owner on an unrelated nola.com article last year, the purpose of the sale was to allow better access to the London Avenue canal levee.]

500 days

Since I filed a FOIA request with the Corps of Engineers' New Orleans District for the following documents:

"1) The Comparative Cost Analysis generated by Black & Veatch under task order CZ05 of contract W912BV-07-D-1002 (original and modification attached). This report is described as a deliverable on page 7 of the original task order and is described on on page 4:

"Cost Differential Analysis. Review and analyze the cost differential and methodology between the 2006 Conceptual Design Report and the 2008 90-day study and report to congress."

2) The Basis of Cost Estimates generated by Black & Veatch under task order CZ05 of contract W912BV-07-D-1002 (original and modification attached). This report is described as a deliverable on page 7 of the original task order."

These are the reports the Corps has never released which show in detail why they chose the cheaper, technically inferior Option 1 (canal depths stay where they are, pumping stations at each end of each canal which must be coordinated every time lakefront gates are closed, New Orleans taxpayers must pay extra $10 million in annual property taxes upon completion of construction to pay for maintenance of three extra pump stations) over the favored-by-everyone-except-the-Corps Option 2 (canals depths dug to ground level and lined with concrete, single pump station at each canal mouth, no property tax increase).

But 500 days isn't the oldest FOIA request I have into the Corps. That goes to this one:

"1) Any and all emails, memoranda, and other documents related to the operation, maintenance, design, or any other matter relating to the pumps, gates, and all other associated equipment at the interim closure structures (17th Street, Orleans Avenue, London Avenue) sent or received by the following individuals between 12:01 AM November 5, 2009 and 11:59 PM November 14, 2009, as well as between 12:01 AM, December 6, 2009 and 11:59 PM December 16, 2009:

a) Colonel Alvin B Lee
b) Karen Durham-Aguilera
c) Christopher Accardo
d) Carl Robinson
e) Michael Stack Jr
f) Nancy Powell
g) Raymond Newman
h) Donald Constantine
i) Dan Bradley

Responsive documents should include all attachments to the emails, as well as the emails themselves.

2) After action reports for Corps New Orleans District activities undertaken in preparation for and during Hurricane Ida and the December 11-13 rainstorms."

The Corps doesn't want the curtain pulled back on exactly how they operate the gates (in the case of the Hurricane Ida event) or how they don't (in the case of the December event, when water repeatedly rose to dangerous levels in the outfall canals and the gates were never closed, at the same time it appears there was a systemwide 6-day-long failure of their SCADA system.

That FOIA request has been pending for 538 days. That places it and the other one in rarefied company. According to the latest DoD FOIA Annual Report , from fiscal year 2010, only 1.1% of all simplified or complex requests to the Army are answered in 400+ days. The average is supposed to be fewer than 50 days.

I'm not interested in setting a record. I wish they would just turn this stuff over.

Drip, drip, drip

When we last looked in on the rusty lakefront pumps, two pumps had been pulled out after the start of the 2011 hurricane season due to oil leaks. Both were at 17th Street (W8 and W9). I know W8 went back in the water, and I'm assuming W9 is also back in.

But that still leaves 15 of the 40 large size (60") hydraulic pumps rusting away in the brackish Lake Pontchartrain waters. 9 of those 15 are at the Orleans Avenue site:


There's one at the London Avenue site:


And, with the assumed return of pump W9, five at 17th Street:


With 9 of the 15 rusty pumps at the Orleans Avenue site, the chances were much greater of an Orleans Ave. pump being the next one to spill oil. That's exactly what happened on August 10, 2011, according to this spill report from the National Response Center (the Corps seems to be improving their spill reporting):

Location: "ORLEANS AVE INTERIM CANAL STRUCTURE PUMPING STATION"

Description: "CALLER STATED THERE IS A LEAK FROM A PUMP AT THE PUMPING STATION. CALLER STATED THERE MAY BE A CORROSIVE ELEMENT THAT IS CAUSING THE SPILL. THE SPILL IS WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE FACILITY. CALLER STATED THERE IS NO SPILL TO LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN."

Released material: HYDRAULIC OIL"

Let's parse that. First, the only corrosive element causing the spill was salt water.

Secondly, there was most definitely a spill to Lake Pontchartrain. The waters within the canals aren't somehow separated from the lake with some invisible barrier - it's all the same thing: navigable waters of the United States. Under the law, if there's an oil spill of any amount into those waters, it must be reported to the National Response Center.

Anyhow, the Corps initially claimed the spill was 20 gallons and that their spill response contractor - QRI - had been summoned. Activities like this always portend a removal of a pump.

Indeed, a pump was pulled out from the Orleans Avenue site: E3. Here's pictures of E3 out:



Steve Beatty tells me the pump remains out while New Orleans gets rain from Tropical Storm Lee on September 2. If it came out sometime around August 10th, it should be back in around September 10th.

However, that still will leave 80% of the Orleans Avenue pumps dangerously close to failure should they be needed during this hurricane season. The Corps could have issued multiple repair contracts for these pump repairs and had them finished a long time ago. Instead they stuck with a solitary small business vendor (Healtheon, with Conhagen doing all the actual repair work) for the last two years. Combine that with the sections of the Orleans Avenue canal levees possessing Safe Water Elevations of zero feet which were left unremediated this spring, and the Orleans Avenue canal is not looking so well prepared.

Steve Beatty of The Lens contributed to this report.

Debris Part 9

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 10
Part 11
Part 12
Part 13
Part 14

Good news on the project at the center of the debris problems on the west bank: WBV-14c.2. That project has had serious problems with concrete, wood, steel, and other flotsam in its dirt supply.

As I've posted in the past, the debris laden dirt was coming out of a borrow pit owned by the River Birch organization, a landfill firm currently at the center of a large federal investigation of Jefferson Parish politics.

This month, the Corps finally (after nearly a year) told the WBV-14c.2 contractor (Phylway) to stop using the cruddy River Birch pit and to switch to the much cleaner Willow Bend pit near Donaldsonville. It was announced as part of an inspection of the site on August 9, 2011:

"USACE recently instructed contractor (via email) to change borrow pit and start hauling in material from the Willow Bend Pit for the remainder of the borrow material for the site. A modification to the contract will be issued in the incoming days.

Approximately 30,000 cubic yards are left to be hauled in."

That same day, the inspectors were told about a rather large chunk of concrete that had been dug out of the existing levee. Remember that this project involves using the existing levee to build up a new, taller levee behind it:


When one looks a picture of the concrete, it doesn't look so bad:


Then when one sees the size of it compared to a truck, it's clear how huge it is:


That was sitting in the levee for years before Katrina struck.

Another deadline missed

Back in June, when the Corps had the press out to the West Closure Complex for their pump demonstration (when they turned on 8 of the 11 pumps), they claimed all 11 would be ready by the peak of hurricane season, defined as the period between Augst 15 and October 1:

"[Corps project manager Kevin] Wagner said the remaining three pumps are expected to be operational by the peak of the hurricane season."

As of today, according to SLFPA-W inspector Danny Caluda, 10 of the 11 pumps (nos. 4 through 13) have been wet and dry tested, but pump number 3 is still not ready, and is possibly not going to be for quite a while. It kind of makes one wonder about Mr. Wagner's designation by the Corps as Project Manager of the Year, especially the fact it was given before the project was even close to finished.

What are the consequences of this? Looking at the results of the modeling done by the Corps in connection with the consequences of the pumping shortfall from the Interim Standing Instructions attached to the WCC Water Control Plan:


Water elevations behind the stations are shown in the left hand column. The reason they stop at 8.2 feet is that is the elevation when stormwater - pumped from local pump stations into the the detention basin formed by the Harvey and Algiers canals - would overflow the floodwalls and levees along those canals. This table assumes two things:

1) The floodgates at the WCC are closed, necessitating turning on the WCC pumps to remove the stormwater from the detention basin

2) The local pumping stations are pumping continuously the whole time, a circumstance the Corps calls "unlikely," but we all know what happens with events the Corps calls "unlikely."

Along the bottom row of the table is the total amount of time for that overflow to occur. It happens because the WCC has no spare capacity built it; it can only keep up with the local pumping stations with all 11 of its pumps on. As you can see, with only 8 pumps it would take a little over 17 hours for the local pump stations to overwhelm the WCC pumps and send water into neighborhoods (either over the floodwalls or because local pump stations would be shut down). There are now ten pumps in place, meaning the WCC can operate for 50 hours continuously until the walls are overtopped or the local pump stations must shut down.

Note that assumes all ten pumps don't break down at any point during that time.

Inspections from the other side

The inspection reports from the state-contracted inspectors on loan to the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority - West (SLFPA-West) have been invaluable in keeping track of the various storylines unfolding at the Corps projects on the west bank. I've personally spun out a dozen posts based on them.

The question has always been, "Why is it only the west bank flood protection authority has these inspection reports? What's the SLFPA-East been doing?"

Wonder no more. I've received the SLFPA-East inspection reports from January, 2010 through June, 2011. They are all bundled up in a single zipped file here. The file is huge - almost 800 megs - and contains about 1360 individual inspection reports and a handful of other related documents. The reports are organized by day and by inspector, with each day having up to five individual reports, each from a different inspector. If you can organize by the file path within your zipped file browser, it'll make it easier to view the reports in order. The inspectors seem to cover set geographical areas (St Bernard Parish, Orleans lakefront, etc), so each report contains information on multiple Corps projects. The inspectors were provided by PBS&J.

I have not reviewed all these files yet, but I wanted to make them available as soon as I could. Enjoy.

Decison day? Yes

According to the GAO bid protest docket website (plug in "W912P8" in the "Solicitation Number" field to get all Corps New Orleans District protests, including the six actions on the permanent pumps solicitation of W912P8-09-R-0013), today is the deadline for the first of the permanent pump station protests to be decided. Of course, that might just be an artifact of the GAO's reporting, and the decision might not come for a couple of months. Still, I did want to put the news out there.

Update - later in the day

Maybe today wasn't the deadline, because no decision was recorded on the GAO's webpage. Perhaps the actual deadline is in October, as I surmised earlier. Hits on my blog today indicated keen interest, so maybe something happened and the webpage just didn't get updated.

Update - the next day

Huge news - the GAO upheld all the bidders' protests.

They updated their webpage today, indicating the protests were sustained. They also released a statement on the decision to the media, but not to the public yet. The Times-Picayune wrote it up with the lede:

"The process the Army Corps of Engineers used to award a $675-million contract for pump stations to a New Orleans firm that had hired an official who formerly worked for the agency was flawed, according to a decision from Congress's investigative arm."

This refers to the lead firm in the winning coalition - CDM - hiring Richmond Kendrick, the Corps' former Chief of Program Execution for the just shuttered Hurricane Protection Office (HPO).

It's remarkable that the GAO actually rejected a bid award because of the infamous revolving door between the Corps and their contractors.

There was some other stuff too:

"The GAO's decision noted several flaws in the process used to award the contract. In particular, the Corps failed to properly evaluate CBY's technical proposal for pump station operation and that bidders 'may have been misled about the role of price in the evaluation.'"

Corps stenographer Engineering News-Record also had a write-up, adding an extra detail:

"Related to pump station operation, GAO also notes a technical discrepancy, says White. "The Corps evaluation was flawed because the agency's requirements for withstanding lateral loads," he says."

I'll keep an eye out for any indication the revised bid specs have been circulated to the final five bidders, assuming all of them bid again. It's hard to see how CDM will succeed unless they remove the problem that led to the decision, but we'll see.

And of course, this means the rusty pumps will stay out there much longer. Even if they all have their carbon steel parts replaced with stainless steel, there's still unaddressed design flaws. And the testing they do - ten minutes every six or eight weeks (or longer - it's kind of whenever they get around to it) - doesn't prove anything other than they can turn on the engines.

Debris Part 8

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 9
Part 10
Part 11
Part 12
Part 13
Part 14

All of a sudden, the debris story grew legs over the last three days, with multiple reports in multiple outlets. In part it was due to concern over stuff like this:


We'll return to that a little later.

Media interest before SLFPA-W July board meeting

The spark for the sudden jump in interest was the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority - West's (SLFPA-W) July 25, 2011 regular board meeting, where the Corps was called to account for all the unresolved debris problems. The SLFPA-W board appears beyond fed up, as they released multiple documents to the media in an effort to overcome any Corps spin. By all accounts, they may have succeeded.

Before the meeting there were two reports, one from WWL-TV and one from Fox 8 (WVUE).

WWL's July 25th report included video from the SLFPAW of a large chunk of debris getting dug out of a stretch of extremely troubled project WBV-14c.2 (contractor: Phylway; borrow source: River Birch):


The video also includes a map of WBV-14c.2, seemingly taken from the SLFPA-W, showing the entire project is of concern:


The WWL report includes a number of quotes from a clearly fed up SLFPA-W President Susan Maclay, such as this one characterizing the debris:

"'... you have large pieces of bricks and concrete and rocks and steel rods and wood, almost tree trunks,' Maclay said. 'This is going to undermine the levee.'"

The WWL story also reveals (again through documents released by SLFPA-W) that some Corps Quality Assurance (QA) inspectors claimed they alerted Corps upper-ups about the problem:

"Even more disturbing, she said, is that the corps' quality assurance reports reveal that its own inspectors have also alerted corps management about the problem.

One entry says, '...again mentioned to CQC the importance of removing objectionable materials.'

'But management has not done anything about it,' Maclay said.

She said so far the corps' management has only responded with what she calls excuses, with the corps saying the amount of debris in the levees is within specifications.

'But if you read the specifications, clearly it's not,' Maclay said."

Based on the level of antipathy by the Corps toward the state inspectors we've seen recorded in the state inspector's reports, I think such excerpts from Corps QA folks need to be taken in perspective, but they are enlightening.

One other thing: while the WWL report indicates "CQC" in the quote above stands for "Corps Quality Control," that's wrong. It actually stands for "Contractor Quality Control." It is the contractor, not the Corps, which is responsible for quality control - like ensuring there's no debris in the material - on Corps jobs. Nevertheless, Corps upper management has long been aware of these problems.

Fox 8's first report aired a day earlier, on Sunday, July 24, 2011 (video can be found at link. I'm not embedding it because Fox 8's embedding doesn't seem to work right).

It highlights a July 15, 2011 letter from SLFPA-W President Maclay to Corps New Orleans District commander Ed Fleming (linked here), which says, among other things "the use of unsuitable material in the construction of this project has been pervasive and continues unabated." The letter concentrates only on three projects: WBV-14c.2, WBV-15a.2, and WBV-3b. The problems at WBV-14c.2 are well documented, as are those at WBV-15a.2, though notably the letter lists many other concerns at WBV-15a.2 besides debris.

WBV-3b seems to be a particular focus of the SLFPA-W. The inspection records available online do not give the full picture which undergirds that concern, but records recently released by the SLFPA-W do. How about this:



That is a huge log that was pulled out of the finished levee at WBV-3b on June 15th during part of the pre-final inspection of that project. But that's not the worst, because look what happens when the camera pulls back:


We can see giant chunks of concrete, what appear to be logs even bigger than the one in the detail above, and an assortment of junk that should make everyone at the Corps wonder what exactly their commanders were crowing about two weeks earlier on June 1st of this year, when they claimed the system was ready for a 100 year storm. And Maclay's July 15th letter indicates there was more:

"Because our inspectors reported finding large logs and other unsuitable material in this levee section [WBV-3b], the contractor [Shavers-Whittle] and USACE's construction division visted the site and removed utility trailers filled with unsuitable material."

That's "trailers," as in more than one. Yikes.

Interestingly, the Fox 8 report includes maps of the projects listed in the letter which appear to go beyond the projects highlighted. Specifically, this map:


The voiceover during the report says this shows the section of levee from the new Westwego pump station to Orleans Village. That description corresponds with the "official" description of only WBV-14c.2, which is located here, in the northern half of the highlighted section on the Fox 8 map:


The highlighted section on the Fox 8 map actually goes much further than the eastern end of WBV-14c.2, tracking all the way down to the end of another project with debris problems, WBV-14b.2:


I don't know what the source document for the Fox 8 graphic was. The July 15, 2011 letter from President Maclay does not explicitly reference WBV-14b.2, and the Fox 8 graphic misplaces the location of Orleans Village:


More than likely, this was simply a graphics error by Fox 8, even though we know WBV-14b.2 has also had debris problems.

Media reporting of the meeting

Anyhow, after the SLFPA-W board meeting, there was another flurry of stories. Again, WWL-TV and Fox 8 had reports (I'm only embedding WWL's video; Fox 8's can be found at the link because their embedding doesn't work too well):



The Times-Picayune also chimed in.

All three reports hit mostly the same notes. They all reported the same platitudes ("public safety is out number one priority" and such) and excuse-making by the Corps. From WWL's report:

"Monday, corps officials pointed out, the Westwego levee [specifically WBV-14c.2] is still under construction, and some areas analyzed could have been cleared of debris after inspectors left.

They said spot inspections often lack proper context."

This is pure BS. There are literally dozens of inspection reports, some on a weekly basis, with hundreds of photos taken along lengthy stretches of multiple projects showing debris all over the place. Indeed, we've seen the "we'll clean it up" excuse from the Corps' QA guys too many times to count. And the tone of such comments undermines the further BS about the Corps' work being a partnership with SLFPA-W and the state.

Perhaps it is then fitting that the New Orleans District is being shoved aside in part of their QA duties, as WWL goes on to report:

"[Fleming] said a new inspection team will be on the ground by next week, the number of inspections will be increasing and crews will trench the levees in some spots to determine how deep inside debris is located.

[...]

Corps officials said the new inspection team will come in from outside the New Orleans District."

Fox 8 says the outside QA team will be overseeing only the trenching:

"Also, a quality assurance team will arrive in town soon to oversee the trenching work."

And unfortunately, it doesn't appear that team will have much autonomy, as the T-P reports:

"Overseeing the efforts will be senior project manager Kevin Wagner."

Wagner is an old hand at the New Orleans District.

Of course, the trenching on the new levee is also a major development. We've already seen trenching occur on the existing levee at WBV-14c.2, when it was being used to build up the new levee:


It was found to contain a ton of debris, just like the new incoming dirt. The Corps tried to discount the findings of those excavations; fortunately the state did their own analysis which confirmed the excessive debris in the existing levee.

I personally think comments from SLFPA-W president Maclay in the first WWL story are the most on point:

"Maclay said it may well be necessary to tear down the levee and rebuild it from scratch."

Based on the reports, that sounds about right.