Fix the pumps

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

The trench

Over the next few posts I'll be looking at the current gate structures at the lakefront. Specifically, I'll be detailing the gates themselves (which are two feet too short), the front line storm defense for the city of New Orleans for the foreseeable future.

The basic design
The basic design of the gate structures at all three sites is similar. A large framework holds the gates (individual gate segments are called "needles") in place. At all three sites the gates are lowered and raised by hydraulic winches. They slide down between vertical guide columns until they come to rest in a keyway, or "trench" at the bottom of the canal. Here's an overall view of the London Avenue gates showing those components except the trench, which is underwater (taken from the Corps of Engineers Flickr stream):


And here's a closeup of a London Avenue needle riding in its guide rails during an actual high water event, the rainfall event of September, 2009 (also taken from Corps of Engineers Flickr stream):


And while all three sites' structures share these basic elements, there are substantial differences among them. In broad terms, the gates at 17th Street are different from those at Orleans and London because the 17th Street gates were designed by a different firm from the other two.

Here's the 17th Street design:


The force of the water at 17th St is transferred to the main structure and foundation at three points - two directly connected to the structure and the third being the trench in which the gates sit.

And here's the London/Orleans design:


The designs at Orleans and London allow for force to be transferred only through two points: the upper point on the structure and the trench. That upper point is clearly seen in this shot of the Orleans Avenue gates under construction on May 26, 2006 (via SCPR Flickr):


This difference makes it all the more critical that the gates sit properly in the trenches at Orleans and London. However, that does not obviate the need at 17th Street for full seating of the gates, especially since the 17th Street structure lies nearly directly on the lakefront, as opposed to being set back like London and Orleans.

As I mentioned above, the bottoms of the needles seat into a trench along the bottom of the canal. The trenches are lined with regular carbon steel, despite being submerged in seriously brackish water. This is a major oversight. They should have been stainless steel, but the Corps cheaped out. The Corps' consultants, Black and Veatch, picked up on this in 2006, when something could have been done. From their December, 2006 "Alternative Considerations Report," which (in part) looked at the possibility of salvaging parts of the Interim Closure Structures for use in the permanent stations, here's what they said about the trenches in a discussion of the Corps' material choices:
"Stainless steel is often used for embeds/wearing surfaces/seal plates/seal bolts and nuts for a permanent structure. There are no special materials for these components on the gates. An example is the needle trough embedded in the diaphragm seal cap. This submerged feature is fabricated of steel but not equipped with cathodic protection and will degrade and have maintenance issue[s] over time. Stainless steel is often used for this feature."

We know how the brackish water has treated the hydraulic pumps which also reside there: very poorly. The Corps is now pulling all those rusted pumps out from all three sites, after the pumps leak oil into the canals through the holes opened up by the rust. They are replacing all the pumps' carbon steel guts with stainless steel pieces. Details on the pump repairs are here, and details on the oil spills are here.

While the materials of the trench liners at all three sites are carbon steel, there is a slight difference between the designs of liners. Here's a detail of the trench liner from the drawings for 17th Street:



Note the trench liner at 17th Street was designed with a little rounded curb to encourage the gates to slide in:


Here's the trench liner at London and Orleans (no curb):


Without that curb, the trench design seems a little less robust at London and Orleans than at 17th Street.

Keeping the trenches clear

At all three structures force from storm surge is transferred to the foundation through - in part- the gates' contact with the trench. Thus it is very important the trench be kept clean so the needles can seat properly. And when the needles are in the trench, they need to stay there, to make sure the forces are transferred evenly through the structure, as well as ensuring the needles don't let surge through to the canals. My later posts will examine how the needles are supposed to be kept securely in the trench, as well as whether their design truly keeps water out.

To keep the trenches clean, the Corps has a standing contract with a firm called Independent Divers out of St Rose, LA, previously known as H.J. Merrihue. According to publicly available contract documents, they seem to do all the diving work for the Corps New Orleans District. Independent Divers is supposed to go down and clean out the trenches periodically, as well as immediately in advance of storms when the Corps expects to shut the gates. They're also supposed to be on call for emergency cleaning.

That's exactly how it worked in 2008 as Hurricane Gustav approached in late August. The Corps called on Independent Divers three times:

Task order 36
August 23 at London Avenue
"An emergency dive is required due to a possible obstruction keeping the gate from properly closing."

Task order 37
August 27 at London Avenue
"Dive team is required to investigate the concrete sill, including gate troughs, by using underwater video equipment to determine if any problems exist during opening and closing procedures."

Task order 38
August 31 at all three sites
"Divers are required to be on-site and be equipped with a water jet pump in the event that sills require cleaning, so that gates can properly close."

The last task order was exactly what we should be seeing - a preemptive task order ensuring that crews were on site if any gates needed to be closed. Good thing, because the gates at London and 17th did drop in Gustav the first week of September, and then again about two weeks later during Hurricane Ike.

And during high water events in 2009? Not so much. More on that in a later post.

So what precisely do the divers do down there, ten feet below the water's surface? Here's the verbiage from the 2009 Operating Manual for the Interim Closure Structures:
"For each structure having one or more gates that will not lower to the 100% seated position, the notches should be checked by a diver. The diver should go along the entire length of each notch of the structure. A high pressure hose should be available for the diver to use to blow out silt that may have accumulated in the notches. The diver should locate foreign objects that may be in the notches and if they are small enough, he should remove them. If the diver encounters an object that is larger than he is capable of moving the diver should secure the object with cables that will allow it to be removed by a crane"

This is not the best way to do things. The trench cleaning could have been automated with a jetting system. The Corps themselves designed a jet dredging system that can at least be operated without divers nearly 20 years ago to help clean out difficult-to-get-to spots on the Empire floodgate in St Bernard Parish, so this is not a new or difficult problem.

The Dutch pointed out the problem of not having an automated trench cleaner publicly to the Corps in the pages of National Geographic in August, 2007:
"A Dutch engineer recently visited some of the new floodgates and pumps installed at the mouths of the city's three main drainage canals. His verdict: They may be 'doomed to fail' in the next big storm.

The engineer, who asked not to be named because he sometimes collaborates with the corps, noted that the gates have no mechanism to remove sediment and other debris that might keep them from closing as a storm approaches. Instead, the corps says it will rely on divers to check for obstructions and clear them away."

It goes without saying that relying on divers is the cheapest way in the short term to clear the trench, but the repeated calls (at about $10,000 a pop) quickly make it cost ineffective. However, no one ever got rich pointing out how much foresight the Corps has.

Grout fills the trenches

In addition, the conditions of the trenches themselves are questionable. In the summer of 2006, while the 17th Street and Orleans structures were under construction, the Corps had their foundation subcontractors spray jet grout around the bottom of the sites while doing foundation reinforcements through deep soil mixing. A detailed scholarly article explaining the foundation work from International Water Power and Dam Construction magazine written by a Corps staffer can be found here.

Let me just say here that I'm no expert in soil mechanics. However, it is surprising to me that of the three sites, it is London Avenue that did not have its soil strength improved. After all, it was the London Avenue canal that had two breaches during Katrina, and a third area where the wall tipped but didn't fall. 17th Street had one breach and Orleans Avenue had none. One of those London breach sites and the tipped wall are within eyesight of the spot where the current gates sit. And the current safe water level at London is five feet, the lowest of all three canals. All of this is due to the poor soils along the London Avenue canal.

Now it is possible there is a legitimate reason for not improving the soil strength at the London gates site. It is set back quite a way from the lake, so the forces imposed by a surge are reduced. In fact, that is a primary reason for the selection of the site for the permanent London Avenue pump station, which is similarly recessed from the lakefront. This setback might mitigate the need for soil improvements. Nonetheless, it is certainly an eyebrow raiser.

Anyway, back to the grout at 17th Street...

The jet grout was supposed to be confined to the dirt at the bottom of the canal. However, the grout got everywhere, including into the trench under the needle gates. It was so bad the middle needle of the 17th Street gates was cemented into place. That is why so many photos from that time show that segment down with the others up. Here's an example from July 30, 2006:


It wasn't that way by choice - the Corps cemented it in place.

The Corps had to bring in divers, jackhammers, and backhoes on barges to beat the hardened grout out of the trenches for days. The Times-Picayune reported on it in their August 8, 2006 editions:
"Contractors jetted a special grouting compound into the sediment beneath both gates between July 20 and July 31 as a way of hardening and strengthening the foundations, St. Germain said.
"'Last Wednesday, they were testing the gates and the gates wouldn't go down because of the grout, which had oozed into the sill the gate sits in,' he said. 'The material was injected in front of the sill and when they started putting the material in there, it expanded and swelled up, and made its way onto the sill.'

Contractors used a backhoe working from a barge, with assistance from divers, to break the hardened grout from the sills."

Here's that barge with the backhoe still stationed in front of the gates five days after the article:


When this story broke, the full implications were somewhat muted by the Corps. The full implication is that the gates would not have worked at all because the needles would not seat in the trench. They only discovered the problem when they went to lower the gates in advance of a tropical system.

During an August 17, 2006 interview on WLAE's "Road to Recovery" program, then-New Orleans District Commander Col. Richard Wagenaar mentioned during a discussion of the grout problem that they were planning to place inserts in the trench, in order to keep silt out when the gates were not operating. This never happened. Independent Divers has continued to clean out the trenches for the last four years.

It also appears that they may not have cleaned out all the grout that first go-around in 2006. In May, 2007, I reported that the gates at 17th Street still wouldn't close properly during a May 15, 2007 drill. A year later, they were still having the same problems. Task order 26 was issued to Independent Divers on April 14, 2008 and includes the following verbiage:
"Provide professional diving services in accordance with the attached performance work statement. Inspections required, with grout/material specically [sic] to be removed at 17th Street Canal (which is over 1 foot thick in many areas), and will be cleared with a water jet pump. Note: the dive contractor stated that the dive team will not use a dive boat at these particular floodgates, based on past experiences. Dive services are estimated for 2 days."

This was almost two years after the Corps assured the public the trenches were cleared of grout.

Grout fills the site

One other matter: the T-P article on the trenches really doesn't give a true sense of how much jet grout there was all over the place. Fortunately, the contracted engineering designers detailed everything in a presentation they gave to the Corps' 2007 Infrastructure Conference:


Here's pictures of the jet grout far above the bottom of the canal at 17th Street, also from that presentation:



If that's what it looks like on shore, imagine the what happened under the water. One hint is how the middle needle looked right after they broke it free from its grouty shackles in the late summer of 2006:


Taking the amount of grout on the gate as a guideline, there was about 3 feet of solidified grout sitting on the bottom of the canal over the trench:


What a mess.

Conclusion

So that's the trench. The design of the 17th Street version was better than the ones at Orleans and London Avenues. However, the condition of the 17th Street one (and the Orleans Avenue one) is questionable at best after getting beaten up by jackhammers in 2006.

The next few posts will look at the needle segments, the winches, and the dogging pins. There's a reason I'm doing this, and it's not nice.

Wednesday, August 18, 2010

Safety first

[Updated July 3, 2011]

Let's return to the work happening August 14, 2010 at the 17th Street site photographed by Steve Beatty. It's a good bet possiblity this work is being performed by a subcontractor to architecture and landscape architecture firm Perez APC under contract W912P8-10-P-0139. Normally I would offer link to this contract, but the Corps has thus far refused to even acknowledge my FOIA request for it, even violating the 20 day statutory maximum for such an acknowledgement.

[Update July 3, 2011

The Corps turned over the Perez bridge pump repair contract and the solicitation that led to it, W912P8-10-T-0091, on July 1, 2011, over a year after my June 24, 2010 FOIA request was filed. I have enabled the links.

The contract specifies repairs to four of the fourteen 42" bridge pumps with the same basic scope as the second Healtheon contract - replace all the carbon steel internal and external piping with stainless steel piping. It is likely at least some of these pumps had their Rineer motors and other moving parts like bearings seals changed out, but this contract didn't specify it. Also, the contract doesn't say which pumps specifically were included in the scope, but there are more documents to come on this request.

The reason I changed the verbiage from "good bet" to "possibility" above is because the contract was awarded April 23, 2010 with a required completion date of June 1, 2010. That doesn't mean the work was actually done by then - contract slippage is a way of life with the Corps - but it does open the possibility someone else was doing the work in August, 2010. Another mitigating factor is that the contract left the pulling and reinstallation of the pumps to someone besides Perez or whomever they hired. The contract says, "The government needs 30 days to install the pumps." When I get the rest of my request fulfilled, hopefully I can nail down the chronology and the details.]

Steve took a number of shots, found here. We'll start zoomed all the way out:


Before getting into the pump work, note the uncoupled absorbent boom on the lower left. This would appear to be part of the upstream boom that came detached when the remnants of Tropical Depression #5 came ashore. There's much more detail about the boom in my previous entry, Boom goes the oil.

Moving on, we can see the Corps' rental crane was being used. And we know from the photos on the 13th there was likely work happening on bridge pump #7.

Zooming in a little further:


Pump #7 had arrived at the site the morning of the 14th.

What followed were some preliminaries, including having one of the contractor workers ride in an aerial lift basket down to the spot where the pump was to be reinstalled. Here's the first part of that sequence, with the basket being flown directly over the other employees while attached to the crane:


Here's what OSHA regulation 1926.100(a) says about head protection:
"Employees working in areas where there is a possible danger of head injury from impact, or from falling or flying objects, or from electrical shock and burns, shall be protected by protective helmets."

An aerial lift basket attached to a crane is a definite danger from falling objects.

Corps of Engineers safety manual EM 385-1-1, chapter 5, paragraph 05.D.01 says this about head protection:
"All persons working in or visiting hard hat areas shall be provided with and required to wear Type I or Type II, Class G (General - low voltage electrical protection) or Class E (Electrical – high voltage electrical protection) headgear."

That's bureaucratic-ese for "hard hat." The section goes to say,
"Hard hat areas or activities are those areas with potential hazard of head injury; in general, all construction areas are considered hard hat areas."

For reference, the entire Corps safety manual is here.

Corps of Engineers safety manual EM 385-1-1, chapter 16, paragraph 16.G.09(b)(3) says this about an employee being under a suspended load,
"No employee shall be permitted to work under any suspended loads. Exception: Where workers are engaged in the initial connection of steel or employees are unhooking the load."

And finally, while it does not become effective until November of this year, OSHA's just-promulgated revised crane standards have a lot to say about lifting stuff with a crane over people's heads. Specifically, there's an entire section devoted to it (1926.1425) titled "Keeping clear of the load," which basically says no one is allowed in the fall zone under a load.

So the basket was lifted over the other employees' heads (yikes!) and then lowered in front of the deck to a position in front of the slot for pump #7:


Let's zoom into the worker in the basket:


There's a lot to mention here. First off, the guy isn't wearing a personal floatation device (PFD), better known as a life vest, even though he's directly over the water, which is 10 to 12 feet deep there. This a major no no. The section of the OSHA construction regulations about work over water (1926.106) says,
"Employees working over or near water, where the danger of drowning exists, shall be provided with U.S. Coast Guard-approved life jacket or buoyant work vests."

And it's not like the PFD's aren't available. You can see them in the previous shot:


They were sitting in the same spot on the front end of the rental crane the previous day:


I've also noted that he's not wearing a hardhat. One might make the excuse that he's in an enclosed cage, so how could he hurt his head? Consider what would happen if the crane operator accidentally dropped the line holding the cage a couple of feet very rapidly. How strongly would his head hit the top of the cage? Pretty hard I'd guess.

In addition to that, OSHA has a specific regulation addressing head protection for workers on crane-supported personnel platforms. 1926.550(g)(4)(ii)(f) says,
"In addition to the use of hard hats, employees shall be protected by overhead protection on the personnel platform when employees are exposed to falling objects."

The Corps' safety manual copies that line word for word in their chapter 16, at paragraph 16.T.04(e).

But more striking than the lack of a PFD or a hardhat is the fellow's position in the basket. With his feet on the middle guard rails and his rump on the uppermost rail, it is very easy to imagine him pitching backwards out of the basket into the water. That's why activities like this are prohibited by OSHA at 1926.550(g)(6)(i):
"Employees shall keep all parts of the body inside the platform during raising lowering, and positioning. This provision does not apply to an occupant of the platform performing the duties of a signal person."

The Corps safety manual says the same thing at 16.T.06(g):
"Employees (except a designated signal personal) shall keep all parts of the body inside the platform during raising, lowering, and positioning."

The new OSHA crane standard goes even further, remarkably addressing this exact situation (which one would not think necessary until seeing the picture above!). New subparagraph 1926.1431(k)(2)(ii) says,
"Platform occupants must not stand, sit on, or work from the top or intermediate rail or toeboard, or use any other means/device to raise their working height."

Finally, there is also the open question of where his fall protection is. He does not appear to be wearing a harness with an attached lanyard. This particular confluence of circumstances (an aerial lift of a worker in an basket over water) is not quite as black and white vis a vis the harness as one might think. Normally workers in a personnel platform like this are required to wear a fall protection harness and be hooked into the platform (or basket in this case) with a lanyard. However, the work over water adds a wrinkle. OSHA issued an interpretation on this very situation in March of this year.

It basically says that while the worker is in the basket over the water, he is allowed to keep his lanyard unattached even though the letter of the law says he must remain tied off to the basket. This is because if the basket were to come off the crane hook, he would be at a much greater risk of drowning by being attached to the basket. This interpretation is notable because it assumes that the worker is wearing a PFD - the idea of someone not doing so over water is too crazy to even consider.

If the worker was only in the basket to go down and inspect the area around where pump #7 would be reinstalled, then it's barely conceivable he wouldn't be wearing a harness. However, if he was planning to get out of the basket on to the scaffolding, there would not be any reason for his not wearing a harness, because he would have to tie off as soon as he got on the scaffold from the basket. The reality is the guy should have a harness and a life vest on, and he should be tying his harness off to the basket when it flies over the structure.

There's lots other stuff here. For example, when personnel are working over water, OSHA (and the Corps for that matter) requires that a boat be available for water rescues. Access to the water at the 17th Street site is not easy; there's certainly no direct access from the main deck or the pump platforms. Steve Beatty's photos don't show any boats at any of the typical access points upstream or downstream of the structure, nor are there any nearby when the worker is over the water. What if the guy fell in the water, not wearing a PFD? Would his fellow workers be able to get to him in time without a rescue boat?

The next shot, taken about a minute after the previous one, shows the guy in the basket with his feet back on the floor of the basket. It also confirms his lack of a hard hat:


It also shows one of the other employees (still without hardhats) acting as a signal person, communicating with the crane operator on how to position the basket. It makes sense for such a person to be in the vicinity of the load as it is lifted (though not underneath it, as he was in earlier photo above). However, it raises the question as to what the other two employees standing near him are doing in such close proximity to an active critical lift. They should be outside a barricade, assuming it was erected before the lift began as required by OSHA and the Corps.

The final shot, taken about a minute after the last one, shows the basket appearing to be tipping off of vertical as it comes in contact with a drain pipe on the structure:


The standard clauses for Corps contracts include requirements that the contractor and their subcontractors adhere to OSHA rules and the Corps' own safety manual. It is, to say the least, quite unclear where the oversight was on these subcontractors on August 14th, and one has to wonder about the quality of the work when so little regard is devoted to their own safety. And don't forget, as I mentioned in the last post, all the protective oil boom at the site was either floating loose or beached during this same time, showing a similar disregard for the Clean Water Act and applicable Louisiana state statutes.

So the Corps isn't really into:
- contractor safety
- addressing corrosion during design and startup of pumps
- fixing deeply corroded pumps quickly
- reporting oil spills to state or federal authorities (in 2006, 2007, or from 2007 onward)
- controlling oil spills

What exactly are they into?

Appearances!


In a future post we'll talk about all the cute trees they've planted at the gate sites, while allowing the actual pumps to rot.

Boom goes the oil

[Updated 8/20/10]

In the previous post, you may have noticed an odd thing about the look of the 17th Street site. The Corps is apparently changing their booming strategy to combat hydraulic oil leaks from the rusting pumps:


On the west side, the solid and absobent boom came completely untethered. They are supposed to be anchored around the hydraulic pumps, like this:


Were that the only problem, it would be serious, but not quite earth-shattering. However, that is not the only problem.

Rewinding a bit, we know that the hydraulic pumps leak oil. They are turning into rust as we speak, and mechanically they are not exactly robust. In addition to carbon steel piping on their insides and their outsides, which is subject to deep corrosion in Lake Pontchartrain's brackish waters, they also have failing seals, glands, motors, and bearings. There's hydraulic oil inside all those components, and the Corps' preventative maintenance program over the last three years has been non-existent, meaning oil leaks are always imminent.

For all those reasons - and years of experience of at least 40 oil leaks across all three sites - the Corps has two tiers of absorbent and solid boom installed at each gate structure. The closest-in bunch of booming is installed right at the pump platforms (shown above), while the outer tier is on either side of the gate structure. Here are the outer booms at 17th Street:


Note that these outer booms are the only protection against spread of a leak from the 42" bridge pumps mounted below the deck at 17th Street. There are no close-in booms installed around those pumps.

Regarding the Google satellite shot, we can date them fairly specifically, because they memorialize this spring's pump repairs. Take a look:


Pumps E1 and E2 were out of the 17th Street site some time between March 16, 2010 and April 15, 2010. The satellite photos also caught the repairs over at London Avenue during the same period:


That's pumps E4 and E4 out. All four of these pumps were repaired under task order #2 of the new Healtheon repair contract. I reported on these repairs in my post "This year's scramble."

Back to the booms... They are maintained under a contract with QRI of Baton Rouge, the same contract that calls for QRI to respond to oil spills. Due to redactions in my FOIA request for the contract, we don't know how much the Corps pays for that maintenance, but I guarantee it is a lot.

The booms are also mentioned in the Corps' Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plans for each site. These plans - as well as the spill countermeasures described therein - are mandated by federal law. The three plans are pretty much identical to each other, since there's more similarities among the sites than differences. There's three mentions of the containment in the 17th Street SPCC plan:

Page 17:
"Oil containment booms are used to surround the pump platforms and across the outfall of the drainage canal. This boom should be rotated on a regular basis during the monthly inspections (to ensure maximum containment potential). Rotation or replacement of the boom is the responsibility of Canal Captain or their designee."

Page 18:
"The pump hydraulic hoses are not contained and are above water and containment by 'oil boom' is needed. This boom should be rotated on a regular basis during the monthly inspection (to ensure maximum containment potential). Rotation or replacement of the boom is the responsibility of the Canal Captain or their designee."

The 17th Street Canal Captain is Ray Newman.

Page 19:
"Hydraulic Pump Platform Piping. Three-inch diameter pipes (hoses) transport hydraulic oil to the pumps. It is estimated that the maximum flow volume that may be released due to rupture of one of these pipes is about 50 gallons. More likely is leakage from the quick disconnect connection to the hydraulic motors (5 to 10 gallons). Calculations are based on this scenario. These are located over water and oil discharge will need to be contained. Currently, there is an oil boom surrounding the structure. This should remain in place to capture any leakage. The hydraulic piping (hoses) to the pumps could be changed out to stainless steel pipe to reduce the likelihood of rupture. All piping in this area has been pressure tested to 4,500 psi."

It's interesting that the mention of switching out the carbon steel piping for stainless - currently underway at a dangerously glacial pace - even shows up in the SPCC plan. That plan was prepared years ago, long before the current round of repairs. The Corps has long known the right thing to do - they just haven't done it.

So we've established where the booms are supposed to be placed, and that the Corps has assured the federal and Louisiana state governments that the boom will be in place to contain oil spilled during routine operations, like during nice weather or maintenance.

In my last post, I mentioned a report WWL-TV did August 10, 2010 on the future permanent pump stations. Part of that piece had reporter Katie Moore and a camera crew traveling to the 17th Street site to do a brief walk-and-talk on the deck of the structure, as well as capturing a bunch of b-roll around the site.

Some of that b-roll shows the boom apparently in place on the 10th. Here's the boom downstream of the structure, near the outlet of the canal:


Here's a peek of the boom upstream of the structure near the Hammond Highway bridge, apparently installed:


And here's the absorbent and solid boom around the east hydraulic pumps:


The next day, the 11th, the remnants of Tropical Depression #5 started rolling through New Orleans. Peak water levels in Lake Pontchartrain at 17th Street went from about 1 ft to about 2 feet at their worst, around 9 PM on the 12th. The maximum gusts went up to about 20 mph. It was as weak as tropical disturbances get.

So let's go back to that picture Steve Beatty took on the 13th, which shows the boom that's supposed to be surrounding the west hydraulic pumps was instead floating free in the canal:


It seems a good bet this was a result of the TD#5 remnants. It would have been nice for the boom to stay in place, but I guess I can understand it getting dislodged by a storm, even though the storm was a minuscule one.

And as I said, if that had been the only section of boom removed, and if it had been put back immediately after the storm, it wouldn't have been that big a deal.

However, the story is much worse. Steve Beatty made a return trip to the 17th Street site on August 14, two days after TD#5 was over. Here's the conditions of the boom all over the site:




Worst of all, the downstream boom, which is the final boom that prevents oil leaks from escaping out into the lake looked like this:


I suppose the Corps' excuse in this case - despite knowing that oil leaks can happen any time from their rusty pumps - would be, "It's not like anyone could knock an oil hose free."

Yeah, that kind of makes sense...


Oh.

That's a contractor in a metal basket hanging over the water during preparations to reinstall bridge pump #7 August 14th. I'm certain that a crane swinging an aerial lift couldn't possibly knock oil hoses free.

Now there's all kinds of things wrong with what's going on in this photo, which I'll cover in my next post. But for the purposes of this post though, the point is that the Corps let all the oil containment booms at the 17th Street site come loose, didn't do anything about it for at least two days, and had contractors doing work on the pumps during that time that could easily cause a leak. Heck, if the plan was test run pump #7 by the end of the day on the 14th, it's a strong possibility some oil would leak during startup. Yet the work proceeded on the 13th and the 14th without any spill protection in place.

Not good. And it gets worse in the next post.

Update, 8/20/10

At some point between the 14th and the 20th, the Corps had their contractor put the booms back:


Steve Beatty contributed to this report

Labels:

No urgency

Updated July 25, 2011. See end of post.

In the distinct absence of any meaningful response to my FOIA requests, I've been tracking activities of the Corps at the lakefront gates through secondary means.

Since the last round of repairs in May, I've been wondering if the Corps would do any work on the pumps during hurricane season. On August 10, 2010 I got my answer.

That day, WWL-TV aired a report on the future permanent pump stations. As part of the report, reporter Katie Moore did a walk and talk on the deck of the current 17th Street gate structure. And as she talked, she walked past evidence of continuing pump corrosion repair work:


That's the inlet to one of the fourteen 42" pumps mounted under the 17th Street structure deck. Except, it looks either brand new or very cleaned up. It also has new zinc anodes attached to it - conclusive evidence the anti-corrosion work is continuing in some small way.

As a reminder, the anodes are the little blocks of zinc that get attached to the outside of the pump to prevent corrosion of the pump itself. Here they are on 17th Street 60" pump W5 when it was lowered into place March 16, 2010 (detailed in an earlier post):


Just like the aluminum or magnesium anode in your water heater, the zinc anode on the pump housing corrodes preferentially instead of the pump, hopefully lengthening the pump's service life. The original anodes installed with the pumps were inadequate in the extreme, so more have been added during the pump repairs underway this year and last. You can read about those repairs to the corroding pumps in my earlier posts "Imminent," "How did the pumps get from...," "This year's scramble," and "Worse than previously known."

Now, when I say the repair work is continuing in some small way, I mean very small. On August 13, 2010 Steve Beatty of The Lens went out to all three sites to survey any work going on. None of the forty 60" pumps are currently out for repair, despite the absolute need for repairs on three quarters of them. It's conceivable a few others have gotten done since May - we just don't know, since the Corps has refused to fulfill my months-old FOIA requests for repair reports. However, it's impossible that they've all gotten repaired. If the Corps were serious about fixing these things, they would be rotating them out right now, even though it's hurricane season. They're not doing that, so as it is now, most of the 60" pumps are just slowly rotting time bombs.

While the story on the 60" pumps is depressing, albeit predictable, Steve did catch the work that's ongoing at 17th Street on the 42" pumps:


You can see that the rental crane is in place above the pumps toward the middle of the deck, and there's a contractor's truck parked up there too. Let's zoom into the middle to see what they're working on:


That's pump #7 out. But wait, haven't we seen that before?

Yes we have, on April 28th:


And going back even further, in mid-March:


So the Corps has apparently been working on this one pump for six months! Keep in mind that their contractor for the 60" pump repairs, Conhagen, was turning around four of those larger pumps in a space of six to eight weeks this spring.

There is a little good news. Apparently they finally got 42" pump #9 (which was out at the same time as #7) back in the water with new stainless steel piping. You can see the shiny piping in the picture above. And when Steve Beatty went back to the site the next day, pump #7 had been delivered for installation:


There's more on that at a future entry. In addition, I belive there's probably two other 42" pumps (which have been getting worked on since March) which are due to be repaired and reinstalled or are already back in. That's based on contract information which I have not yet received via FOIA, but know about through FPDS. More specifically, it's a good bet this work is being performed by a subcontractor to architecture and landscape architecture firm Perez APC under contract W912P8-10-P-0139, initially worth $131,880. The contract does not specify which pumps were to be repaired.

So based on the limited contract information and the photos, it looks like the other ten 42" pumps (representing 1200 cfs, or about 13% of the total site capacity) will have to wait. All of them still have carbon steel piping (it is painted black) destined to rust:



So that's the current state of pump repair work at the three sites, such as it is.

This information is based on the available information, including on-the-ground photography and Corps documents released through FOIA. The Corps has been absolutely atrocious in releasing documents to me, so if there are gaps in my knowledge, blame them. I've had requests in to them (very narrowly tailored requests, I might add) for months asking for reports and contracting information on these repairs, and the requests have gone unfulfilled. In one case, they have even ignored the law and not even sent an acknowledgement of my request within the statutory 20 day period. The Corps can afford to pay millions on public affairs contracts and keep a phalanx of Public Affairs officers on staff directly, but when it comes to actually releasing hard information under the law, they are the absolute worst I have ever dealt with, and that includes the City of New Orleans under Ray Nagin.

Update July 25, 2011


Upon the July, 2011 receipt of documents requested under FOIA, I learned the Corps deliberately did not schedule any work on the 60" pumps during hurricane season. However, when unscheduled events happened - like pumps developing leaks - they did pull them out and send them to Conhagen for repairs.

At the time this post was written (August, 2010), this had happened twice earlier in the summer. An oil spill on June 2, 2010 had led to 17th Street pump W1 getting rebuilt at Conhagen later in June. And in mid-July, pump W1 at the London Avenue site would also be sent for a rebuild at Conhagen. Details about both of these repairs, including photos from Conhagen's repair reports on each, can be found at the subequent post, "The latest on lakefront pump repairs."

So, the status diagrams at the time should have looked like:





Steve Beatty and Karen Gadbois of The Lens, and Molly Peterson of Southern California Public Radio contributed to this report.

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