Debris Part 11

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 9
Part 10

After the flurry of debris reports in east bank projects during the spring of 2010, the reports - oddly - seemed to stop for about a year. But they started appearing again in the spring of 2011 as the Corps rushed to beat their June 1st deadline.

In Orleans Parish, the first spring 2011 mention of debris was on LPV-106 in the April 8, 2011 report:

"Still clumpy rocks in section between [Corps project LPV-]107 & [Corps project LPV-]108 where seeding has taken place."

Here's the locations of those three projects:


LPV-106 came up again about a month later, in the May 4, 2011 report:

"Still concrete and debris in turf area."

These referred to areas of finished levee. The contrator (L&A) had apparently placed soil with excessive debris in it and had yet to remove the debris from areas where grass was attempting to be grown.

We know the reports from April and from May were referring to separate areas of LPV-106 because of the May 5, 2011 report, which had more detail:

"Contractor has started a crew from [project LPV-]107 west towards Read blvd clearing debris from levee section to be grassed next. They will also clear out left debris in reach 5 and reseed in areas that grass has not established. Tuesday I will inspect levee clean up as contractor plans to seed next week."

The section of LPV-106 from LPV-107 west toward Read Blvd. is part of the much larger western section of the project, as opposed to the report in April of the smaller eastern patch between LPV-107 and LPV-108.

The same report noted debris in the soil on the flood side of the levee at adjacent project LPV-107 (contractor: Shavers-Whittle):

"debris removal and grading on flood side of levee."

About a week later, the May 11, 2011 report mentioned the contractor and the Corps had declared victory over the debris at LPV-106:

"contractor has cleared access rubble/debris from 107 tie in till Jahncke pump station [aka Sewerage & Water Board drainage pump station 14]. Contractor has not been able to confirm when seeding will take place."

Here's the location of Read Blvd. and the Jahncke Pump Station:


It was clear the debris problems were not conquered in May, because a month later they were still getting mentioned in LPV-106 updates. In the June 16, 2011 report we learned:

"Contractor is continuing to address debris in levee."

Frustratingly, none of these reports include photos. However, it is clear debris continued to be an issue even past the vaunted June 1, 2011 deadline when the Corps declared the system 100 year storm ready.

A second batch of spring 2011 debris reports comes from the Corps projects in St Bernard Parish. They're located here:


On February 24, 2011, the SLFPA-E inspector wrote about project LPV-148.02 (contractor: Cajun Construction):

"Observed fill material at top of levee slope appear to be non compliant with more than one percent contaminants in work area 1A and 1B."

The following day's report had a bit more detail:

"Discussed issues found on previous day's observation with Butter Compton. 1. Quality of backfill used for dressing levee does not conform to specification. Also quite a bit of dirt was left on stabalization slab. Butter talked with contractor and a coordination meeting is scheduled for Tuesday March 01, 2011."

We never find out what happened. The inspection reports are silent. However, debris continued to be a concern elsewhere.

LPV-146 (contractor: St Bernard Levee Partners), April 1, 2011:

"Contractor backfilled area on protective side with concrete rubble at the 90 degree turn in the wall at MRGO and Verrett [sic] wall."

See the map above for the sharp bend at the southeast corner of LPV-146.

Fortunately, we got pictures of this incident:








The reports don't indicate whether the concrete rubble was later removed.

LPV-145 (contractor: Chalmette Levee Constructors), April 4, 2011:

"There was discussion about debris and gravel in the slopes of the flood side. It appeared that the haul road material was pushed into the slopes of the flood side."

LPV-147 (contractor: Integrated Pro Services), April 5, 2011, after a pre-final inspection:

"There is unsuitable material and debris in the earthwork of the protective side slopes.

LPV-149 (contractor: Conti Group), June 16, 2011:

"There are concerns for backfilling with debris and trash."

That's seven projects with 2011 reports of debris in the dirt. That's on top of the six projects with debris concerns in the spring of 2010.

If you then combine that with the 9 west bank projects with debris problems...


You get 22 projects where debris has been a problem either in the existing levee, in the new levee, or in both.

22 projects.

Is it now obvious there is a systemwide problem with the integrity of the levees built by the Corps? It should be.

Debris Part 10

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 9
Part 11

Much pressure was brought to bear upon the Corps over the past few months to address the debris problems in the west bank levees, and there have been halting measures to do so. A "tiger team" of other Corps people from outside New Orleans was brought in, they dug some holes in the levee at a single one of the projects (in the wrong spots), and then dug some more holes (in the right spots) while they literally tried to bury the evidence, which included a shopping cart and hubcaps. They also promised Senator Vitter they would add the west bank levees to their third party review process - a process meant to review designs before they're built, not after they're all done and shown to be defective.

But the west bank levees were not designed or constructed in a vacuum apart from the rest of the region. One must ask if the same problems have arisen with the rest of the system. The answer is "Yes."

We know of two large debris fields in the Lake Pontchartrain lakefront levees in Kenner, because the Times-Picayune reported on them in November, 2009 and January, 2010. In those cases, the existing levee was found to be filled with junk from a site on North Claiborne Avenue in New Orleans. The spoiled soil had been placed there by the Corps in 2000-01. We never heard about any further east bank levee problems after that, and the Corps certainly attempted to give the impression they were isolated - albeit 8000 foot long - cases.

A few months back I noted the receipt of the reports from the inspectors assigned to Corps projects within the geographic area assigned to the east bank levee authority (the SLFPA-East). I have finally finished plowing through them, and will be presenting what I've dug out over the next few posts. First up is evidence of many more instances of debris in the east bank levees. All the excerpts below are taken from these reports, downloadable at the earlier post.

Let's start at project LPV-104.02 (LPV stands for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, the official Corps name for all the levees on the east bank of the Mississippi). Here's the location of LPV-104.02:


LPV-104.02 is a catchall project involving a few small projects bundled together along the lakefront between the London Avenue canal and the Industrial Canal. One of those little projects was the installation of a vehicle ramp over the levee behind the main campus at UNO (University of New Orleans).

The lead contractor on LPV-104.02 is Quality Enterprises. They were placing the first "lift" of the ramp on the UNO side of the levee in May, 2010 (a "lift" is a layer of dirt, usually six to twelve inches thick). On May 13, 2010, the SLFPA-E inspector wrote the following about his inspection on the prior day:

"1st 6" lift was applied on protected side of the levee. Material from stock pile on LPV-104.01 [adjacent project - ed.] was used for this lift, and placed over the area that was cleared and grubbed 10" to 12" as stated by specifications. The material despite how much was cleared, was filled with small shells. These shells mixed with the material used for the first lift which caused it to have more than 5% debris in material. Material used was also considered to be too wet to pass moisture test, but will be cut up to dry out before next lift would be applied. Billy Rossignol [Corps resident engineer for the project - ed.] was asked to come and make a decision regarding the material being filled with the shells from the site. The decision was made that nothing can be done about this lift and to leave as is."

Isn't that nice? The bottom six inches of the earthwork are filled with shells (at 5 times the specified limit, no less), as shown in this picture from the same report:


But don't worry, they did something:

"Corrective measure will be done to prevent this from happening in the remaining lifts. Corrective action include not stockpiling material on the site, and scraping the surrounding area to move shelled material away from toe of ramp. (40ft offset to be exact)"

Note their "corrective" measures did not correct the actual problem by removing the debris. Their response to that was simply to leave it in place, which it is now.

Isolated incident of debris in the dirt? Not so much. Over at LPV-108 (contractor: Boh Brothers), a lakefront levee project at the exreme end of New Orleans East as shown on this map:


the SLFPA-E inspector wrote in his April 16, 2010 report:

"Corps inspector mentioned being unhappy with the size and amount of rock that is in the soil being used. Will follow up with this."

The follow-up came in the April 27th report:

"The dirt as mentioned in previous report is has not been filtered properly. It is filled with debris and material over the specified allowable size and over the specificed percentage of the material. The Contractor will be getting a formal letter requesting a correction plan from Billy Rossignol."

The inspector included this photo:


along with a caption informing us the material had been placed in the levee, debris and all:

"An example of the size of rocks that have been pulled from the surface of the material. This is a very small amount compared to what is on the surface of the entire project. Also if this is what is on the surface, what is located through the entire soil subsurface[?]"

That's a damn good question. Based on what we've seen at the west bank projects, the answer is probably that the LPV-108 levee had debris inside it.

A couple of weeks later, the May 13th report read,

"Corrective action has been done regarding soil conditions. Boh Bros was asked to remove a 5' wide by 6" deep section of material along the entire wall. Perform compaction and moisture tests on the area. Replace with stock pile material from pit, compact, and test to specifications."

Anyone who thinks the debris only went 6" down, raise their hands.

Just the Corps folks and their contractors? Okay, moving on...

Throughout the spring of 2010, debris was found at three other lakefront projects. At project LPV-103.1A1 (contractor: Aquaterra-CAYO), a levee project located in Orleans Parish between the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals...


...SLFPA-E inspectors reported the following:

"Starting to clean out dirt on the west side. The embankment material is full of large rocks and debris which is unacceptable for final use. Process will continue till the material is to specification." (April 20, 2010 report)

"Working on filtering out unwanted material in the back fill that is onsite." (April 30, 2010)

"Continue to remove debris in material on west side of Bayou St. John." (June 17, 2010)

Unfortunately, this is all the information we have from the reports. However, the events at two other projects were described more fully.

At LPV-19.2 (contractor: Phylway), a Jefferson Parish lakefront levee enlargement placement project located on either side of the Causeway:


this got reported on May 5, 2010:

"Found unsuitable material on F/S of levee at stations 409+00 and 419+50. It appears to be an old ramp that was covered up. Once contractor has provided enough material on site to fill the area they will start to do exploratory excavation to see exactly how much material will be removed."

Those locations are just 1000 feet apart, yet the Corps appears to have not dealt with anything in between them, viewing them as isolated instances. Pictures from the report give some more perspective, albeit only on the easternmost debris site at station 419+50, right next to the Causeway:



Te black stuff in the lower photo appears to be about a foot thick section of asphalt.

It is unclear if Phylway covered up the debris-laden area during prior work placing a berm at the base of the levee, or if they were excavating it in anticipation of normal work. Whatever the choronology, it is interesting to see their name on yet another project involving debris.

However, unlike the west bank projects Phylway worked on, in this east bank case, the Corps decided to excise the debris from the existing levee. Subsequent inspection reports tell us Phylway started moving in replacement material very quickly (5/6/10: "Began stockpiling material for areas where they are to remove unsuitable material."), and the removal of the bad dirt started around a week later (5/14/10: "Dug out unsuitable material area near Sta. 419+50. Unsuitable area around Sta. 409+00 still to be dug out."). Photos from the May 14, 2010 report show the excavation:



The dig out of the debris-laden material continued for about a week. The May 20, 2010 report said Phylway had moved to the second area: "Unsuitable material was removed from the F/S of the levee at Sta. 409+00. The area was approx. 150' wide." Photos also show that removal effort:



The Corps had a walkthrough on May 24, 2010 to determine whether Phylway had gotten everything. A third area was actually found with debris, according to the May 25, 2010 report: "Area at Sta. 407+00 near the Severn ramp where unsuitable material was found was dug out some more to remove a little excess that was found during inspection on Monday 5/24/10. Area was reinserted and approved for contractor to begin placing material and bring levee section back up to grade." Here's a picture:


But they declared victory on the other two areas and started backfilling them at the same time. Here's a photo of that backfilling in the May 27, 2010 report:


About a week later, the backfilling was nearly done, according to the June 2, 2010 report: "Work at this reach is almost done with the two sites that had material removed almost rebuilder [sic]."

Other than a single mention buried on page 21 of a SLFPA-E set of board meeting minutes from May, 2010 (minutes which were not published until two months later), none of this activity at LPV-19.2 was ever revealed to the press or the public by anyone. Given how close these events were happening to the beginning of the 2010 hurricane season, that's understandable from a public relations viewpoint. From a "complete disclosure," "partnership," or "protection of citizens" viewpoint though, I can't think of a justifiation.

But there were even more debris-related problems out at the lakefront besides all these. In April, 2010, debris was found in at LPV-20.1 (contractor: L&S/CKS Joint Venture), the project to enlarge the Jefferson Parish lakefront levee from Bonnabel over to the 17th Street canal. Here's the location of that project:


The first mention was in the April 13th report. It was just one sentence: "Special report filed unsuitable material in Levee." The "special report" was not included with the regular report.

The following day the SLFPA-E inspector reported "follow up" at the site, but gave no details. Reports over the following two days revealed the location (a ramp in front of the Coast Guard station) and the fact that more debris had been found.

On April 19th, it was revealed the Corps held a walkthrough to decide whether enough debris had been excised to allow the ramp to be rebuilt. This report (by a different inspector) also included much more detail:

"The USACE held a final walk through to approve the removal of unsuitable material in the Ramp and Levee. After a second check of levee the levee was deemed to be clean. The material that was removed will be stockpiled at Williams Blvd. Boat Launch. The plan is to use the material in foreshore protection. The USACE is still waiting on redesign of ramp."

This report also included photos, which show how extensive the dig out was. The photos are shot looking east toward the 17th Street canal, progressing from the protected (land) side of the levee to the flood (lake) side:





It's that last photo - showing the LPV-20.1 debris removal effort was not confined strictly to a protected side ramp, but also involved the flood side facing the lake - which is the most disturbing by virtue of the caption: "Flood side of levee any remaining large chumks [sic] of concrete will be removed."

"Large chunks of concrete?" Yikes.

Like the debris problems at LPV-19.2, this also got a single mention in the SLFPA-E board minutes, in this case on page 16 of the April, 2010 minutes. There was nothing else.

That's five different projects across two parishes with debris problems in the spring of 2010, almost none of which was revealed to the public. In the next part we'll discuss even more projects where debris was found as recently as last spring, after the Corps declared the system 100-year ready.

Seriously?

Times-Picayune, October 26, 2011:

"Mark J. Titus, 48, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud for bilking $1.2 million from a construction firm in a scheme allegedly aided by his brother-in-law Dominick Fazzio, River Birch's chief financial officer.

Fazzio, 58, of Slidell, used two construction companies he owns to send seven fraudulent invoices from June 2008 through March to Garner Services, a New Orleans construction management firm, according to a five-page "factual basis" for Titus' guilty plea."

FedBizOpps.gov, December 9, 2011:

Y--West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, LA HSDRRS, Lake Cataouatche Levee Enlargement, Phase 2, First Lift, Jefferson Parish, LA ED 11-203Solicitation Number: WBV15A-12-S-0001
Agency: Department of the Army
Office: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Location: USACE District, New Orleans

"This is a combined synopsis/solicitation for commercial items prepared in accordance with the format in Subpart 12.6, as supplemented with additional information included in this notice. This announcement constitutes the only solicitation; proposals are being requested and a written solicitation will not be issued.

THIS IS BEING POSTED FOR SUBCONTRACTING OPPORUNITIES ONLY. PROPOSALS WILL ONLY BE ACCEPTED FROM MATOC HOLDERS AS FOLLOWS:
[...]
W912P8-10-D-0009
Garner Services, LLC
348 S Diamond St
New Orleans, LA 70130-3808

POC: Mark Titus
Email: mtitus@garnersvc.com
Office: 504-566-1192
Fax: 504-566-1173"
[...]
SYNOPSIS:

The work consists of clearing and grubbing; removal of steel sheet pile; Contractor furnished borrow pit preparation and excavation; placement of earthen material, the earthen material shall be graded and compacted; placement of stone armor; fertilizing, seeding and mulching all disturbed areas and all other incidental work.

What exactly does it take for the Corps to cut ties with companies? This is a solicitation for new business, not an existing contract, but they are insisting on allowing Garner to bid on it. At the very least, don't they read the papers?

Plus or minus two projects

After more than 500 days, the Corps finally released the documents I had been asking for in the permanent pumps saga. It is obvious why they held them back.

In March, 2009 the Corps delivered a report to Congress on the releative costs of Option 1 (keep the existing outfall canal walls, levees, and pump stations, while adding a pump station at the end of each canal) and Option 2 (line the canals with concrete, get rid of the walls and levees, demolish the existing pump stations, and have new lakefront pump stations to handle all drainage). There's also an Option 2a, which adds a diversion of drainage from the Hoey's Basin section of Jefferson and Orleans Parishes. That stormwater would be routed to the Mississippi River.

The report presented these as the costs:


Over $3.4 billion dollars for Option 2. That's certainly an eye-popping number and makes Option 2 look inconceivably expensive compared to the $797 million for Option 1. The Corps, unlike everyone else - including the people protected by this project - wanted Option 1.

There's one problem: it appears those cost numbers are not the truth, according to these new documents.

In a December, 2008 internal cost estimate prepared by Corps consultants Black & Veatch as part of the effort to write the Report to Congress, Option 2's engineering and construction costs were estimated at about $1.8 billion, not the $3 billion+ number.

Let's make sure we're comparing apples to apples here. The internal estimate is strictly for the engineering and construction of the facilities. It leaves out stuff like land acquisition, relocations, and construction management. The line items from the Report to Congress for just the Option 2 pump stations, canal revisions, and engineering were these:


The sum of the highlighted items is $3.219 billion.

There's one further clarification: the internal estimate (a document titled, "Basis of the Cost Estimate Developed by Black & Veatch to Support the 2008 Report to Congress" - the mention of 2008 indicates the original deadline of the report, which was busted by the Corps) calls out a couple of different flavors for Option 2, one with breakwaters in front of the 17th Street canal and Orleans Avenue canal stations, one without. However, that's a minor distinction, because both are about $1.8 billion:


The estimate for the same items as reported to Congress is $1.6 billion more - 77% greater - than what the Corps' internal numbers showed.

Put another way, that's a difference of about double the Congressional appropriation of $804 million for the entire project.

But wait there's more.

The Report to Congress called out the total price for Option 1 as $797 million, conveniently just below the appropriated amount. I wrote quite a bit in 2009 about how the Corps likely slashed their Option 1 estimate to make it fit the appropriation, moving the costs to Option 2. The slashing is confirmed explicitly by the new documents, in a part when Black & Veatch is describing the process of updating their cost estimates from an earlier round performed in 2006:

"Material Costs Update. The 2006 estimate was then updated to current (October 2008) costs. There were significant upward cost revisions in many areas, the greatest being in the fabrication costs for the pumps and drivers. When these costs were added, the Option 1 cost estimate appeared to be very close to, perhaps over, the appropriated amount. This cost estimate was termed the “Robust Adaptable Option 1”. HPO leadership asked B&V to find ways to reduce costs, and an aggressive review of all costs was undertaken.

Base Adaptable Pump Station. Careful examination of the design concepts incorporated in the “Robust” design resulted in significant cost savings, and the development of a new design called the “Base Adaptable Option 1”. This concept and the estimate developed from it, became the basis of the “Base to Go”, the cost of Option 1 for the Report to Congress."

So the "Base Adaptable Pump Station" is the flavor of Option 1 that became the basis for the estimate in the Report to Congress. So what was the internal estimate for the Option 1 Base Adapatable flavor?


$480 million.

Just to make sure we're doing apple to apples, here's what the Report to Congress called out for just the pump station, small revisions to the canals, and engineering:


That total - released in March, 2009 - is $752 million. That's an inflation of 56% from the internal estimate published in December, 2008.

I'm sure there's lots of people out in the field who know loads more about Corps estimating than I do, and would very much like to poke holes in what I'm saying here. However, I believe such criticisms will likely amount to nibbling around the edges of what appears to be a massive overestimation of the costs of the project likely designed to perform two Corps objectives:

1) Make Option 2 look so costly as to be impossible to construct.
2) Make Option 1 look to fit perfectly within the Congressional appropriation.

The public suspected objective 1 was going on. After all, Orleans and Jefferson Parishes commissioned a study showing the actual costs of Option 2 were over a billion dollars less than what the Corps was reporting. However, objective number two, while speculation on my part, appears to be new news. It comes out of the very surprising result that the Corps was radically inflating the Option 1 estimate as well. To what end were they doing this? Perhaps to avoid having the appropriation slashed by Congress. If Congress knew the Corps believed Option 1 could be built for half what had been appropriated, there likely would have been pressure to cut the funds.

What this appears to come down to is that the Corps may have, let's say, "stretched the truth" in reporting the costs of the permanent pumping project to Congress and the public. A $1.6 billion difference in internal and external cost estimates for Option 2 is very tough to explain away, as is the 56% increase in Option 1 costs. But I look forward to the Corps attempting to do so.

5701 Pratt

This is very odd.

A demolition permit for a privately owned house along the London Avenue canal was given to the contractor on the London Avenue canal remediation contract, Integrated Pro Services, on October 4, 2011.

Permit 11BLD-06904 authorizes IPS to demolish 5701 Pratt.

This property falls within an area the Corps said they would use as a staging area during the remediation repairs; it is not behind any of the areas actually remediated. Supposedly all the substantial work on the London Avenue canal is done. So what is going on here?

[UPDATE: More than likely, this is just for the removal of the contractor's construction trailer at this site (see the last page of the Corps' monthly remediation updates - such as this one from the end of April, 2011 - for confirmation of the location), and the New Orleans Safety & Permits department incorrectly typed in the permit as a private home. So it's probably not odd at all.]

[UPPERDATE: I have been told this demolition is actualy for flood protection purposes, and that the house was to be purchased by the Orleans Levee District, though the assessor's record doesn't reflect such a sale. According to a comment by the owner on an unrelated nola.com article last year, the purpose of the sale was to allow better access to the London Avenue canal levee.]